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Fixing SCEP Enrollment Failures on Cisco IOS XE 17.15: The Hidden 1024-Bit NDES Trap

Introduction

Deploying or upgrading Cisco ISR 1000 series routers to Cisco IOS XE 17.15.x introduces stricter cryptographic enforcement that can silently break existing PKI-based IPsec VPN deployments.

When using Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) against a Microsoft Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) server, routers running 17.15.x may fail to enroll their identity certificates – leaving IKEv2 rsa-sig tunnels completely down.

The Symptom: Silent Tunnel Failures

On the surface, the failure looks like a generic VPN or enrollment issue. The router successfully authenticates and downloads the issuing CA certificate, yet it never obtains its own operational identity certificate, causing Phase 1 IKEv2 authentication (authentication local rsa-sig) to abort and keeping the IPsec tunnel offline.

If you trigger a manual enrollment (crypto pki enroll) from a standard SSH/VTY session without debug messaging enabled, the router only displays a high-level enrollment failure without explaining why the request was aborted.

Exposing the Error with PKI Debug Messaging

To see what the router’s cryptographic engine is actually doing during the SCEP handshake, you need to enable PKI transaction and message debugging.

Because SSH/VTY sessions route debug output to the internal logging buffer rather than the terminal by default, make sure you run terminal monitor from privileged EXEC mode (#) before triggering enrollment:

terminal monitor
debug crypto pki transactions
debug crypto pki messages

With debug messaging active, trigger the enrollment again (ensuring enrollment mode ra is configured under the trustpoint):

crypto pki enroll <TRUSTPOINT_NAME>

Answer yes when prompted to request the certificate from the CA. Immediately after the router prints % Certificate request sent to Certificate Authority, the debug messaging exposes the real reason for the failure:

%PKI-3-CSDL_COMPLIANCE_KEY_SIZE_FAIL: The RSA bit key size 1024 is a weak key size used in a certificate under trustpoint <TRUSTPOINT_NAME> and is non compliant
%PKI-3-CSDL_COMPLIANCE_KEY_SIZE_FAIL: The RSA bit key size 1024 is a weak key size used in a certificate under trustpoint <TRUSTPOINT_NAME> and is non compliant
%PKI-2-CERT_ENROLL_FAIL: Certificate enrollment failed for trustpoint <TRUSTPOINT_NAME>
Reason : Failed to create PKCS7 PKCS request

(Tip: If packet policers or SSH buffer limits truncate live screen output, you can pull the captured debug trace directly from the router’s buffer using show logging | include PKI. Always run undebug all once you have captured the logs).

Ruling Out the Usual Suspects

At first glance, %PKI-3-CSDL_COMPLIANCE_KEY_SIZE_FAIL points toward an outdated key on the router itself. However, standard local checks come back clean:

  • Local RSA Key Pairs: Generating fresh 2048-bit general-purpose RSA keys (crypto key generate rsa general-keys label modulus 2048) does not clear the error.
  • Legacy Self-Signed Certificates: Older configurations often retain an auto-generated TP-self-signed certificate created for HTTPS management. Even after disabling ip http secure-server, removing the self-signed certificate chain, and zeroizing its RSA keys, the SCEP enrollment error persists.
  • The Issuing CA Certificate: Running show crypto pki certificates verbose confirms the subordinate/issuing CA certificate installed on the router uses a compliant 2048-bit RSA public key.
  • Removing enrollment mode ra: Stripping enrollment mode ra from the trustpoint stops the local 1024-bit compliance error and allows the router to transmit the CSR, but Microsoft NDES rejects the unsealed payload on the server side with Reason : Failed to get ID certificate from CA server.

The Root Cause: Microsoft NDES Registration Authority (RA) Certificates

The critical clue from the debug output is that %PKI-3-CSDL_COMPLIANCE_KEY_SIZE_FAIL prints twice in a row right before Failed to create PKCS7 PKCS request.

When enrollment mode ra is configured on a Cisco trustpoint, SCEP executes a multi-step handshake:

  1. The router queries the NDES endpoint (http://<NDES_IP>/CertSrv/mscep/mscep.dll) via GetCACert.
  2. NDES responds with the CA chain plus two dedicated Registration Authority (RA) certificates:
    1. CEP Encryption Certificate (used by the router to encrypt the PKCS#7 enrollment bundle).
    2. CEP Signature Certificate (used to verify SCEP protocol responses).
  3. Before sending the request across the network, the router wraps its 2048-bit CSR inside a PKCS#7 envelope encrypted with the public key of the NDES server’s CEP Encryption certificate.

In many enterprise Windows PKI environments built years ago, the CEP Encryption and Exchange Enrollment Agent templates on the Active Directory Certificate Authority were issued with 1024-bit RSA keys.

In earlier software releases (such as IOS XE 17.9.x), Cisco logged a non-fatal warning for 1024-bit RA certificates and allowed the enrollment to proceed. Starting in newer trains and enforced permanently in IOS XE 17.15.x, Cisco hardcoded Cisco Secure Development Lifecycle (CSDL) compliance rules directly into the crypto engine. Any RSA key under 2048 bits encountered anywhere in the PKCS#7 assembly causes an unconditional local abort – with no CLI toggle to bypass it.

Resolution and Workarounds

The Permanent Fix (Windows PKI / AD CS)

To support IOS XE 17.15.x, the Windows PKI must be upgraded the NDES service certificates to 2048 bits:

  1. Update Certificate Templates (certtmpl.msc):
    1. Open the properties for both CEP Encryption and Exchange Enrollment Agent (Offline request).
    2. Under the Cryptography tab, change the Minimum key size to 2048.
  2. Renew NDES Certificates (certlm.msc):
    1. On each NDES server, re-enroll/renew both RA certificates under Local Computer\Personal\Certificates so they are issued with 2048-bit keys.
    2. Remove or archive the obsolete 1024-bit RA certificates.
  3. Verify Zero-Touch Password Policy:
    1. In the NDES registry (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MSCEP), verify DisablePassword is set to 1 (DWORD) if automated, headless router deployments are used without per-device one-time passwords (OTPs).
  4. Restart IIS:
    1. Run iisreset from an elevated Command Prompt on the NDES servers so mscep.dll loads the new 2048-bit certificates.

Bench Workaround: Manual Terminal Enrollment

If your Windows PKI cannot be updated, IOS XE 17.15.x cannot be used with 1024-bit SCEP infrastructure.

Downgrading the routers to the IOS XE 17.9 Extended Maintenance train (e.g., 17.9.6a) serves as the highest available release cutoff that permits 1024-bit RA certificates. On 17.9.x, the router logs a warning during PKCS#7 creation rather than aborting, allowing automated SCEP enrollment and IKEv2 tunnels to establish normally until the PKI servers are upgraded.

Final Thoughts

Upgrading to Cisco IOS XE 17.15.x removes the safety net for legacy cryptography. Even when your router’s local keys and issuing CA certificates already meet modern 2048-bit standards, a single legacy 1024-bit Registration Authority certificate on a Microsoft NDES server will halt SCEP enrollment and keep IPsec tunnels down – with no CLI workaround available to bypass the check.

Before rolling out IOS XE 17.15.x, keep these three takeaways in mind:

  • Audit NDES Templates Early: Confirm that both the CEP Encryption and Exchange Enrollment Agent templates on your CA are set to a 2048-bit minimum key size and that the active service certificates on your NDES hosts have been reissued.
  • Use PKI Debugs to Catch Silent Aborts: Always pair terminal monitor with debug crypto pki transactions and debug crypto pki messages when troubleshooting SCEP over SSH so cryptographic compliance errors surface immediately.
  • Keep IOS XE 17.9.x as Your Fallback: If you cannot update the NDES certificates immediately, remain on the IOS XE 17.9 Extended Maintenance train (17.9.6a) until the server-side infrastructure is upgraded.

See the following Cisco links that have been used to construct this article:

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